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Abstract. Moral judgment and moral dilemmas are a pervasive part of organizational life 
and every decision-maker can and will encounter them at some point. Whether people 
make the utilitarian decision (preferring to maximize overall welfare) or the deontological 
one (choosing to adhere to moral rules), depends both on the contextual aspects, as well as 
on individual traits such as empathy and so-called moral emotions - guilt and shame.  This 
paper aims to study the differences between the utilitarian and the deontologists 
employees in relation with empathy, guilt and shame proneness. In order to discriminate 
the two categories (utilitarian and deontologist), the well-established “Trolley problem” 
was used. In the Switch version, the task can be accomplished by using a lever to switch the 
train track, such that the train only kills one person. On the other hand, in the Footbridge 
version, pushing a very fat man off a bridge, using his body to stop the train, can save the 
five. The following questionnaires were used on a sample of 61 participants (47 females 
and 14 males, aged between M=20,88, AS=1,81): Interpersonal Reactivity Index, and The 
Guilt and Shame Proneness scale. Results showed a significant difference between the 
utilitarian and deontologist on the fantasy and empathic-concern scales for the Switch 
version. However, no significant differences were observed for guilt or shame proneness. 
As for the Bridge version, the differences were identified only on the empathic-concern 
scale and on the Guilt‐Negative‐Behavior‐Evaluation scale of GASP. 
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Introduction  
 
Kvalnes (2015) stated that one can understand moral judgment at work as the activity 
of judging and deciding what is morally right and wrong in an organizational context. 
Moral dilemmas can be encountered everywhere in organizational life. Situations might 
vary from real and acute dilemmas to false, so-called pseudo-dilemmas. False moral 
dilemmas are instances where it is clear what a person ought to do, but he or she is either 
tempted or pressured to do something else (Kidder, 2005, p.7). In a business 
environment, the distinction between these types of situations has also been labeled as 
one between dilemmas and temptations (Brinkmann, 2005, p.183).  
 
In an organizational context, a moral dilemma is typically a situation where the decision-
maker must choose between options that represent some moral requirement. The 
decision affects a range of stakeholders, and some of them can have reasonable moral 
claims to make on the decision-maker, but some of them will be disappointed or 
frustrated (Kvalnes, 2015). A moral dilemma is a choice between wrong and wrong. 
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There really is no choice available that is less wrong than the other choice. The situation 
is one where moral wrongdoing cannot be avoided (Gowans, 1994).  
 
It is also believed that solving moral dilemmas would provide the principles guiding 
morality (Greene et al., 2001), principles that would apply to actual real issues such as 
the one of self-driving machines (Wallach & Allen, 2008). 
 
From the theoretical point of view, a moral dilemma implies the existence of a conflict 
of a moral nature. The basic condition of a moral dilemma is the choice that causes 
contradiction within the subject. He or she is forced to have a choice between two 
actions that both have negative consequences; in both situations, there is a kind of loss 
but the subject is forced to choose. This type of moral dilemma was presented in the 
well-known movie "Sophie's Choice" (1980) directed by Alan J. Pakula, which proposes 
an even tougher choice that, seems virtually impossible to do. A woman with two 
children caught in a concentration camp in World War II is forced by a Nazi officer to 
choose life for one child, and death for the other, and in the situation where Sophie does 
not choose, the SS officer will kill both of them. Despite her plea of "Don't make me 
choose. I can't choose", Sophie's words fall on deaf ears and when a young Nazi is told to 
take both children away, she releases her daughter, shouting "Take my little 
girl!"(www.imdb.com) In this situation, Sophie is embroiled in a profound ethical 
conflict that triggers negative moral emotions, especially guilt (Greenspan, 1983). 
 
There are two main directions in moral philosophy and they differ in their perspectives 
on what people can go to in order to maximize the best possible outcome for the people 
affected by their decisions and actions. First, utilitarianism state that the morally right 
option is the one that will create the best overall outcome while duty ethics or 
deontological ethics, claims that the morality of an action should be based on whether 
that action itself is right or wrong under a series of rules, rather than based on the 
consequences of the action (Kvalnes, 2015). 
 
The definition of utilitarianism implies that the action taken in any moral dilemma leads 
to the achievement of the highest level of collective happiness with happiest people. In 
our case, a utilitarian action in both moral dilemmas implies pulling the switch and 
saving the five lives even if we sacrifice one of them, and also pushing the subject onto 
the rail to save the five lives. Reducing suffering and increasing collective happiness is 
the main concern of utilitarianism. What counts is the collective level of happiness 
rather than the individual. If there is an action that increases the common happiness but 
decreases the individual happiness, the subject in question has to execute that action 
according to utilitarianism (Mill & Scher, 2001). 
 
On the other hand, deontology comes from the Greek word meaning duty, and its ethical 
essence lies in the fact that the action is not justified by consequences. If utilitarianism 
says the purpose excused the means, deontology says that means are important. The 
deontological principles are of Kantian origin and are very much like the religious ethics 
that state one has to behave with others as to themselves (Kant, 1996). Within the 
chosen dilemmas, the deontological conception would have had an answer in not 
sacrificing a person's life to save the other five lives. Therefore, the answer noted with 
NO (not pulling the switch/not pushing the fat person off the bridge) is considered 
deontological. Regarding the moral dilemmas selected for this research (trolley), 
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previous studies showed that more utilitarian answers were obtained to the first 
dilemma and deontological answers for the second dilemma (Greene, 2014). The 
participants tested by Greene tend to approve the action of pushing the shifter in the 
case of the first moral dilemma (the shift), because the brain imaging results show that 
emotion zones (the amygdala or the medial gyrus) are not activated. In the second moral 
dilemma (the bridge), the situation changes radically, since getting closer to the person 
who becomes a (potential) victim automatically activates an emotional, deontological 
type response. Greene has also tested other moral dilemmas in his study and obtained 
the same results, namely activation of emotional areas in the brain (activating m PFC-
medial prefrontal cortex and amygdala) in a situation where there are personal 
involvement and proximity (Greene et al., 2001). 
 
Recent findings in psychology and neuroscience suggest that moral judgment is more a 
matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning (Greene & Haidt, 
2002). Zahn-Waxler and colleagues (1992) consider that there are different emotional 
conditions that can influence moral decisions. Among the most discussed we can find 
guilt, shame, distress, sympathy, and empathy. Empathy is regarded as the ability to feel 
the same as the other and to understand and share his or her emotions (Molchanov, 
2014, p.90). It consists of different components: physiological, cognitive, emotional and 
behavioral (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). 
 
Human’s empathy has a social-cultural nature and it develops through several stages 
starting from childhood (Hoffman, 2000). The role of family education for empathy 
development is very high. The parent’s attitude determines the child’s ability to 
recognize emotions and feelings and to be able to share them and feel with others in 
childhood (Molchanov, 2014). Empathy is the basis of all pro-social behaviors and 
underlying the manifestation of compassion. Nevertheless, empathy is different from 
the feeling of pity. When you feel pity, there is a sense of separation from the other, you 
are sorry for him or her but you are not affected, you feel separate, while empathy 
involves a sense of compassion and feeling in communion with the other. But, as a 
mechanism for the observer to experience the affective state of the observed person, 
empathy provides direct feedback to the observer about how the consequences of an 
event are affecting or will affect the observed person, therefore we envisage significant 
difference on some empathy scales between utilitarian and deontologist participants. 
 
Self-conscious emotions show how we feel when we reflect on our own experiences, 
especially regarding the possible consequences of our actions (Tangney, 1990). 
According to previous studies (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), self-conscious emotions 
considered to be at the same time moral emotions are shame and guilt. Events that cause 
shame, as well as guilt, are of a social nature. The main difference between shame and 
guilt refers to the fact that shame involves a negative assessment of the whole being, 
while guilt is triggered in direct relation to a specific situation or behavior (Tangney, 
1990; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Shame and guilt offer contrasting motivations, namely in 
shame, the effect is to conceal, deny or escape from shameful places, while in guilt, the 
effect is mainly to repair the wrongdoing. 
 
Moral emotions motivate ethical behavior; they encourage people to act in accordance 
with accepted standards of right and wrong. As stated by Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek 
(2007) moral emotions provide the motivational force to do good and to avoid doing 
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bad. Guilt proneness is a personality trait indicative of a predisposition to experience 
negative feelings about personal wrongdoing. Guilt proneness is associated with 
empathic concern, perspective-taking, and a subscription to conventional morality 
(Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1991).  
 
Although previous studies have stated that moral emotions are critical for deterring 
unethical and antisocial behavior (Haidt, 2001; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, 
Stuewig, & Mashek 2007), there is still a disagreement about how those moral emotions 
- guilt and shame - should be defined, differentiated, and measured (Smith, Webster, 
Parrott, & Eyre, 2002; Tangney, 1996; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Wolf, Cohen, Panter, & 
Insko, 2010). Both guilt and shame are self-conscious emotions evoked by self- 
reflection and self-evaluation, and they both aid in self-regulation (Tracy & Robins, 
2004; Tangney, 2003).  
 
Guilt and shame can be differentiated via a self- behavior distinction (Lewis, 1971; 
Tangney, 1996; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2004). With guilt, the focus 
is on one’s behavior (“I did a bad thing”), whereas with shame the focus is on one’s self 
(“I’m a bad person”). According to this view, guilt arises when one makes internal, 
unstable, specific attributions about one’s actions, which lead to negative feelings about 
specific behaviors that one has committed. Shame, on the other hand, arises when one 
makes internal, stable, global attributions about one’s self, which lead to negative 
feelings about the global self (Tracy & Robins, 2004).  
 
Guilt and shame can also be differentiated also via a public-private distinction. 
According to this distinction, transgressions or failures that have not been publically 
exposed (i.e., private misdeeds) are likely to elicit feelings of guilt, whereas 
transgressions or failures that have been publically exposed are likely to elicit feelings 
of shame (Ausubel, 1955; Combs, Campbell, Jackson, & Smith, 2010; Smith et al., 2002). 
From this perspective, guilt is associated with a private sense of having done something 
wrong or having behaved in a way that violated one’s conscience. Shame, on the other 
hand, is the negative feeling that arises when one’s failures and shortcomings are put on 
public display. Likewise, empathic concern is a construct that is theoretically more 
closely linked to guilt proneness than shame proneness (Stuewig et al., 2010; Tangney 
& Dearing, 2002).  
 
 
Methods 
 
Starting from those empirical findings, the current study aims at finding answers to the 
following research questions: 
RQ1: are there any differences regarding empathy between utilitarian and deontologist 
employees? 
RQ2: are there any differences regarding guilt and shame proneness between utilitarian 
and deontologist employees? 
 
Participants were 61 employed master students from a Romanian public university, 
aged between 19 and 27 years (M = 20.88, SD = 1.81), 14 males and 47 females. They 
were invited to fill in a set of questionnaires compiling the following measures: 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1980), which measures empathic concern, 
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perspective-taking, and personal distress and The Guilt and Shame Proneness scale 
(GASP, Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011), which measures individual differences in 
the propensity to experience guilt and shame across a range of personal transgressions. 
The GASP contains two guilt subscales that assess negative behavior-evaluations (Guilt‐
Negative‐Behavior‐Evaluation; Guilt‐NBE) and repair action tendencies following 
private transgressions (Guilt‐Repair), and two shame subscales that assess negative 
self-evaluations (Shame‐Negative‐Self‐Evaluation; Shame‐NSE) and withdrawal action 
tendencies following publically-exposed transgressions (Shame‐Withdraw).  
 
In order to discriminate the two categories (utilitarian and deontologist), the well-
established “Trolley problem” was used (Thomson, 1985; Fischer & Ravizza, 1992). It 
proposes a set of moral dilemmas, which involve trade-offs between causing one death 
and preventing several more deaths. In both dilemmas, there is a runaway train that will 
kill five people unless another person is sacrificed. 
 
In the Switch version (Foot, 1978) the task can be accomplished by using a lever to 
switch the train track, such that the train only kills one person. So, on the one hand, the 
utilitarian decision requires an ostensibly inoffensive action, and the death of the one is 
collateral damage. On the other hand, in the Footbridge version (Thomson, 1985), the 
five can be saved by pushing a very fat man off a bridge, using his body to stop the train. 
Here the utilitarian option requires a typically harmful action that involves personal 
physical contact, this death being instrumental. 
 
Although one can be skeptical of the practical dimension of the trolley problem, we have 
decided to use it because it provides a clear-cut example, which makes it possible to 
isolate and discriminate particular features of moral reasoning. We may not expect to 
encounter a trolley problem in real life, but the moral intuitions and reflections 
generated by it are nevertheless relevant for how people respond to less dramatic 
everyday situations (Greene et al., 2009).  
 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics for the measures are presented in Table 1 and the results of the 
Mann-Whitney two independent sample tests are displayed in Table 2 to 5. 
 
As shown in table 1, the data respect the normal distribution with the exception of the 
guilt repair scale (skewness = -1.325). The results also show that guilt_repair   scale had 
the highest score (M=22.78, SD=3.61), followed by the guilt_NBE (M=22.55, SD=3.80) 
and shame_NSE (M=21.55, SD=4.44). The shame_withdraw scale has the lowest score 
(M=14.32, SD=4.66). 
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In order to be able to respond to the previously mentioned research questions, a series 
of Mann-Whitney two independent sample tests were performed. 
 
The first aim of our study was to investigate the possible differences regarding empathy 
between utilitarian and deontologist employees (RQ1). The results for the shift problem 
presented in table 2, showed a significant difference only on the following empathy 
scales: fantasy - tendencies to imaginatively transpose into the feelings and actions of 
others (U=177,50, p<0.05) and empathic concern - "other-oriented" feelings of sympathy 
and concern for unfortunate others (U=190,50, p<0.05), deontologists employees 
having significantly higher scores than utilitarian ones. 
 
Table 2. The Shift problem – Empathy Test Statisticsa 
 
Perspective 
taking 
Fantasy 
Empathic 
concern 
Personal 
distress 
Mann-Whitney U 313.500 177.500 190.500 350.500 
Wilcoxon W 1303.500 1167.500 1180.500 503.500 
Z -.976 -3.172 -2.961 -.380 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .329 .002 .003 .704 
a. Grouping Variable: MD_shift 
 
As for the bridge problem, the results presented in table 3 showed a significant difference 
between utilitarian and deontologist employees only for empathic concern scale 
(U=248,00, p<0.05), deontologists employees having significantly higher scores than 
utilitarian ones. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for measures 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Perspective 
taking 
61 23.7377 4.24225 -.444 .306 -.139 .604 
Fantasy 61 25.3279 4.47110 -.168 .306 -.435 .604 
Empathic 
concern 
61 26.1803 3.70364 -.048 .306 -.592 .604 
Personal 
distress 
61 22.9344 4.30065 .212 .306 -.886 .604 
Guilt 
NBE 
61 22.5574 3.80142 -.410 .306 -.896 .604 
Guilt 
repair 
61 22.7869 3.61531 -1.325 .306 1.837 .604 
Shame 
NSE 
61 21.5574 4.44794 -.638 .306 -.111 .604 
Shame 
withdraw 
61 14.3279 4.66448 .235 .306 -.908 .604 
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Table 3. The Bridge problem – Empathy Test Statisticsa 
 
Perspective 
taking Fantasy 
Empathic 
concern 
Personal 
distress 
Mann-Whitney U 350.500 290.000 248.000 312.000 
Wilcoxon W 1340.500 443.000 401.000 465.000 
Z -.379 -1.356 -2.033 -1.002 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .705 .175 .042 .317 
a. Grouping Variable: MD_bridge 
 
The second aim of our study was to investigate the differences between utilitarian and 
deontologist employees in guilt and shame proneness (RQ2). The results for the shift 
problem showed no significant differences between deontologists and utilitarian 
employees in none of the guilt and shame proneness scales (p>0.05). 
 
Table 4. The Shift problem – Guilt and Shame Test Statisticsa 
 guilt_NBE guilt_repair shame_NSE shame_withdraw 
Mann-Whitney U 374.000 354.000 374.000 369.000 
Wilcoxon W 527.000 1344.000 527.000 1359.000 
Z .000 -.324 .000 -.081 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
1.000 .746 1.000 .936 
a. Grouping Variable: MD_shift 
 
Regarding the bridge problem, one significant result was observed, namely on the Guilt‐
Negative‐Behavior‐Evaluation scale (U=242,50, p<0.05). Therefore, the results 
presented in table 5 the deontologist employees are prone to experience bad feelings 
about how they have acted (pushing the fat man off the bridge) significantly higher than 
the utilitarian ones. 
 
Table 5. The Bridge problem - Guilt and Shame Test Statisticsa 
 guilt_NBE guilt_repair shame_NSE shame_withdraw 
Mann-Whitney U 242.500 342.000 326.500 360.000 
Wilcoxon W 395.500 1332.000 479.500 513.000 
Z -2.124 -.518 -.769 -.226 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.034 .604 .442 .821 
a. Grouping Variable: MD_bridge 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As seen on the performed analyses, the results are in line with previous studies that 
have stated that, when people are presented with the trolley problem, a majority 
answer that they would have used the switch to put the trolley onto the side-track 
(Greene et al., 2009). The dominant responses in the trolley dilemma are that people 
appear to be utilitarian when solving the switch dilemma and deontologists when 
solving the bridge dilemma. The main differences between the shift and the bridge 
problem could be seen first and foremost in the number of participants that have to 
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choose to pull the switch (n=44) and those that have to choose to push the fat man off 
the bridge (n=17).  
 
Previous studies (Greene et al., 2001; Hauser, 2006; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007) have 
also assumed that the shift dilemma reflects mainly the utilitarian thinking, whereas the 
bridge dilemma reflects the deontologist type of thinking. Waldmann and Dieterich 
(2007) also argued that throwing the switch in the shift dilemma is in line with the 
utilitarian view, whereas the bridge dilemma is in line with the deontologist perspective 
(Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007, p.247).  
 
Previous studies have shown that certain types of moral judgments involve strong 
emotions (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Majdandžić et al., 2012; Ugazio et al., 2012). 
For instance, it has been shown that empathic concern is positively related to harm 
aversion in moral judgments (Crockett et al., 2010). Similarly, Gleichgerrcht and Young 
(2013) found that utilitarian moral decisions in moral dilemmas similar to the trolley 
dilemma were negatively correlated with the level of empathic concern (the lower the 
level of empathic concern, the more utilitarian judgments were made). Moreover, 
mirrored by our results, utilitarian moral judgment was determined uniquely by levels 
of empathic concern, independent of other aspects of empathic responding including 
personal distress and perspective taking (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013). 
 
Despite a series of limitations such as the reduced number of participants or the self-
reported nature of questionnaires, the current study supports previous research 
illustrating the fact that, when people encounter an impersonal dilemma, which lacks 
salient emotional content (e.g., would you turn a trolley away from five people and onto 
one person?), most people endorse harming the one person for the greater good, thereby 
delivering the utilitarian response. By contrast, when people are presented with a 
personal dilemma (e.g., would you push a man in front of a trolley so that his body stops 
the trolley from hitting five people?), emotions are engaged, leading the majority of 
responders to reject the harmful act, thereby delivering a non-utilitarian response 
(Cushman, 2012; Greene et al., 2009). 
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